Ballantyne (2012) proposes an alternative formulation of the significance condition in terms of the positive or negative effect of lucky events on the agent’s interests: S3: An event E is lucky for an agent S only if (i) S has a subjective or objective interest N and (ii) E has some objectively positive or negative effect on N—in the sense that E is good or bad for S. S3 is more specific than S2 in the kind of attributes that are supposed to be positively or negatively affected by lucky events. It was the ultimate goal of philosophy: to become better people—to fulfill our unique potential as human beings. Since the significance condition establishes a relationship between an agent and an event, whether one thinks that such a condition is needed or not depends on what the target of one’s account is. Baumann, Peter. If S is the value or significance of an event E, how lucky E is can be determined, according to Rescher, as follows: In other words, Rescher thinks that luck varies proportionally with the value or significance that the event has for the agent and inversely proportionally with the probability of its occurrence. The machinations of luck. Rescher defends an objective probabilistic account of luck. This raises the question whether … For example, he contends that organisms—humans included—are lucky to be alive because the gravitational constant, G, is the one that actually is, but the probability that G made life possible is 1. Clearly, all this calls for mutual critical engagement and discussion. In this sense, a human or a dog are lucky to survive a fortuitous rockfall, but a stick of wood or a car are not. A related question is whether the kind of agents to which we attribute luck are only individuals or whether luck can be also ascribed to collectives. Against the distinction between luck and fortune, Broncano-Berrocal (2015) and Stoutenburg (2015) argue that the terms “luck” and “fortune” can be interchanged in English sentences without any significant semantic difference. The last two have to … Coffman defends a specific way to understand the lack of control condition on luck. It seems to me that this is a path that many philosophers would pursue. For example, Coffman (2009) thinks that an event is under an agent’s control just in case she is free to do something that would help produce it and something that would help prevent it. Second, another problem for probabilistic accounts is that, although rare, there are highly probable lucky events, that is, lucky events whose occurrence is highly probable—see Broncano-Berrocal (2015). 74-75). On the one hand, the term “lucky” can be predicated of agents—for example, “Chloe is lucky to win the lottery.” In general, the kind of beings to which we attribute luck are beings with objective or subjective interests such as self-preservation or desires—see Ballantyne (2012) for further discussion. Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn 2010. Luck certainly plays a large role in individual success and failure. John … This is because it seems it won't always be clear to the subjects with respect to what a person is lucky. There is a close connection between the concepts of luck and risk. For presentation purposes, luck will be here described as a phenomenon that applies to agents and events, where by “agent” is meant any being with interests and by “event” any member of the previous categories. For discussion purposes, however, those conditions will be presented here as if they constituted full-fledged analyses of luck, but it is important to keep in mind that modal conditions are typically considered necessary but not sufficient for a significant event to be by luck. The concept of coincidence is also closely related to the concept of luck. 2014. Philosophy Nagel "Moral Luck" STUDY. Levy proposes a hybrid account that conjoins a modal condition with a lack of control condition and argues that the epistemic requirements on control are so demanding that are rarely met; he also applies this account to the free will debate. SP5 yields the correct result in the macabre lottery case, which was troublesome for SP4. According to Pritchard, the only two minor differences between the two notions are, on the one hand, that risk is typically associated to negative events, whereas luck can be predicated of both negative and positive events; on the other, that while we can talk of very low levels of risk, we cannot so clearly talk of low levels of luck. According to Broncano-Berrocal, there are two ways in which something might be under our control. On the other hand, advocates of the subjective approach might explain borderline cases of luck by appealing to the fact that the relevant subjective probabilities are not always transparent, so if we cannot determine whether an event is lucky or non-lucky, it is plausibly because the relevant subjective probabilities cannot be determined either. Against the sufficiency claim, Lackey argues that many nomic necessities—for example, sunrises—are not under our control, but that does not mean that they are by luck—see also Latus (2003) for this objection. A different approach to luck emphasizes the fact that paradigmatic instances of luck such as lottery wins could have easily failed to occur. • Gunther, Max. In “Moral Luck,” Thomas Nagel describes the motivation for denying the existence of moral luck. Probabilistic and modal views have difficulties when it comes to accounting for highly probable or modally robust lucky events arising out of coincidence. The psychology and philosophy of luck. People can make their own luck only in the following sense: "better players tend to stay in the game longer and thus tend to have more opportunities for luck to rear its head." Luck is to some extent a vague notion. However, that person is not less lucky to win the lottery because of that knowledge or because of being in that position. Twenty children die. Joe Milburn also argues that we haven't zoomed in on the right analysandum. Broncano-Berrocal's account also raises traditional worries for lack of control accounts of luck. According to Coffman, that person, who has become completely oblivious to sunrises, is not lucky that the sun rises every morning and keeps her facility running, even if it is something that is neither beyond her control, nor successfully exploited by her for some purpose. For Levy, an event is under an agent’s control just in case there is a basic action that she could perform which she knows would bring about the event and how it would do so. Sam is so honest and committed that it is virtually psychologically impossible for him to be unfaithful towards Mary. But if one holds—with many theorists working on collective intentionality—that groups can be the bearers of intentional states, it might turn out that group luck cannot be so easily reduced to individual luck. McKinnon gives an answer to the question of what does it mean to say that someone creates her own luck and uses her account of diachronic luck to explain how we evaluate performances. Riggs (2007) argues that M1 is defective precisely because there is no non-arbitrary way to fix the relevant initial conditions. To prove that lack of control is not necessary for luck, Lackey proposes a case in which a demolition worker, A, succeeds in demolishing the warehouse she was planning to demolish when pressing the button of the demolition system she had designed to that effect only because the electrical current is accidentally restored after the damage caused by a mouse when chewing the connection wires. M1 has two important features. The distinction serves to delimit the scope of Pritchard’s account: his modal account of risk is an account of event-relative risk—the same applies to the probabilistic view. criticism of luck egalitarianism on the table and describe a doctrine of responsibility-catering prioritarianism (RCP) that can withstand both criticisms. In other words, they focus on relational luck. In the literature, different lack of control views account for luck in those terms. ), The Philosophy of Luck, Wiley-Blackwell, 2015, 224pp., $34.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781119030577. All the essays elucidate the concept of luck in some way or another, except for Sabine Roeser's interesting paper on the Uncertainty Paradox -- the fact that sometimes people prefer a certain outcome at all costs, even when it is the worst case. A different way to model luck in probabilistic terms is by means of subjective probabilities, that is, the kind of probabilities that are determined by an agent’s evidence or degree of belief. Coffman, E. J. Probability and danger. Here we will focus on the concepts of accident, coincidence, fortune, risk, and indeterminacy. However, the relevant probabilities are typically unknown are, at best, approximately known, which might in principle help explain why, say, a goal from the corner kick is neither clearly lucky nor clearly produced by skill: prior to its occurrence, the probability that it would occur was unclear. Among Ancient philosophers such as Aristotle attention was given to the extent to which a person's character and flourishing depended on luck or, putting it differently, depended on factors outside a … The epistemic analysis of luck. S1 requires that lucky agents have the capacity to ascribe significance. Some authors opt for giving accounts of luck that mix modal or probabilistic conditions with lack of control conditions. In particular, he argues that if two risk events E1 and E2 have the same probability of occurring but E1 is such that its occurrence is easily possible, E1 is riskier than E2, but the probabilistic account is committed to say that they are equally risky. McKinnon (2013; 2014) proposes a probabilistic account of diachronic luck instead. Yet, the event is lucky precisely because it arises out of a coincidence. They might argue that knowing exactly how lucky someone is with respect to an event entails that the exact probability of the event’s occurrence is known. The modal account of risk, by contrast, says that an event is at risk of occurring just in case it would occur in at least some close possible worlds—see also Coffman (2007) and Williamson (2009). Bad Luck Versus Good Luck Many discussions of justice and bad luck assume that bad (brute) luck somehow calls for compensation. Genre: Philosophy Date Book: 2011-06-30 Editor by: OUP Oxford Format Book: PDF, ePUB & Audiobooks Download: 240 Languages: English, French and German Download eBook. However, this kind of assertions are felicitous insofar as they are parasitic on our interests. A different lack of control account is due to Riggs (2009), who tries to defend the lack of control approach from Lackey’s objection that the fact that an event is beyond our control does not suffice for the event being lucky. Reviewed by Rik Peels, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. For example, goals from the corner kick in professional soccer matches are considered neither clearly lucky nor clearly produced by skill. PLAY. Suppose that (i) A buries a treasure at location L and that (ii) B independently places a plant in the ground of L. When digging, B discovers A’s treasure. Stoutenburg gives an evidential account of degrees of luck. The view, called the expected outcome view, starts with the observation that we can determine the expected objective ratio of many events, including people’s performances. Suppose that someone is the most wanted person in the galaxy and that billions of mercenaries are trying to kill her, but also that her combat skills drastically reduce the probability that each independent assassination attempt will succeed. The rationale behind this move is, as Latus (2003) puts it, that although lack of control over an event often goes hand in hand with the event having low chance of happening—or with the event being modally fragile—there are non-lucky events that are either beyond our control—for example, sunrises—or have low chance of occurring—for example, rare significant events brought about by ability. However, SP5 might not capture the intuitions of other cases correctly. Cases like this motivate philosophers who theorize about the concept of luck to endorse a significance condition, that is, a requirement to the effect that an event is lucky for an agent only if the event is significant to the agent. In contrast, if the target event is the agent’s action, (1) and (2) do establish a relationship between the agent and her action—for example, that S scores a goal is lucky for S. In the literature, most accounts of luck try to explain what it takes for an event to be lucky for an agent. Match. On the other hand, the term “lucky” and expressions such as “a matter of luck” or “by luck” can be predicated of events—for example, “Chloe’s lottery win was lucky”—and states of affairs—for example, “It is a matter of luck that Chloe won” or “Chloe’s winning the lottery was by luck”; see Coffman (2014) for further discussion. He comes up with one different from the traditional analysandum and that of Coffman: what we should analyze is not an event's being lucky, but its being a matter of luck that some person φ-s. Pritchard elaborates and defends his influential modal account of luck. Suppose that Messi ends up scoring by luck. However, if someone prays with the intention of bringing about some event and the event occurs by sheer coincidence—because that person’s prayers are causally irrelevant to its occurrence—the event is accidental. For example, synchronically, we say things such as “Joe was lucky to hit the baseball at the end of the game.” Diachronically, we say things such as “Joe was lucky to safely hit in 56 consecutive baseball games.” Hales’s point is that we can be lucky diachronically but not synchronically, and the other way around. For example, she challenges the distinction between intervening and environmental luck by pointing to the possibility of a situation in which something is about to intervene but then something or someone else intervenes, so that the former intervention doesn't take place and the situation proceeds normally. In the same way, as causally relevant intentional action prevents an event from being an accident, causally relevant intentional action seems to prevent a pair of events—someone’s flipping of the coin and the coin landing heads—from being a coincidence. These two complex issues are a matter of controversy in ethics and political philosophy, respectively. There is certainly a sense in which a group of individuals can be said to be lucky, as when we say that a group of climbers is lucky to have survived an avalanche. People are systematically mistaken about logic, about probability theory, about statistics, and so on, so why couldn't they be systematically mistaken about such a thing as luck? Finally, Levy (2009; 2011: 17) thinks that fortunate events are non-chancy events—hence non-lucky—but luck-involving, in the sense that they have luck in their causal history and, in particular, in their proximate causes. The concept of control. In knowing something, one could not be wrong about it. For instance, if the reader sticks with the order of essays found in the book, she will read Pritchard's modal account after the criticisms of that same account by Broncano-Berrocal, Coffman, and Milburn and probably wonder how Pritchard would deal with those objections, as he does not address them in his paper -- which is perfectly understandable, since these essays are all in the same volume. The difference between (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (3) and (4), on the other, is that (1) and (2) denote a relation between an agent and an event, whereas (3) and (4) are not indicative of any relation and only apply to events. and safety can rule out the pernicious kind of epistemic luck, or the kind of luck that interferes with knowledge. This shows, contrary to what OP1 and OP2 say, that luck does not entail low probability of occurrence. However, Levy (2011: 17–18) argues that if we accept that an event that does not occur in half the close possible worlds is lucky, we can also accept that an event that does not occur in little less than half the close possible worlds—for example, in 49 percent of them—is lucky as well. The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Lackey thinks that whimsical events—that is, events that result from actions that are done on a whim—show exactly this. Lackey’s second objection targets the idea that the easy possibility of an event not occurring is sufficient for luck. The moral of all these cases is that luck is—or at least seems—fully compatible with determinism. For example, Mark Heller (1999) contends that person S’s belief that p is epistemically lucky (and hence not knowledge) if p is true in the actual world, but there is at least one world, in a contextually-determined set of possible worlds, where S’s belief that p is false. A volume with many of the papers contained in this bibliography. 1. Nonetheless, Pritchard leaves as a contextual matter what features of the actual world need to be fixed in our evaluation of close possible worlds. However, (1) and (2) are not equivalent to (3) and (4). Intuitively, however, A and B would be equally lucky if they won the lottery. Thinking about luck. For example, a lifeguard who accidentally goes to work very early and sees a swimmer drowning is lucky to be in a position to save the swimmer, but if done competently, it is not by luck that she saves him. It seems wrong to evaluate whether or not someone is good based on luck - but it is what we do anyway. One way to account for the difference in luckiness is that while the former event is not significant to anyone, the latter is significant to whoever is nearby. If the experiment is under-described, then people might make a correct judgment about a different state of affairs than the event that the experiments have in mind and if it is described in sufficient detail, one should always take the possibility into account that people are confused about the relevant state of affairs rather than about whether some specific state of affairs Σ is due to luck. In particular, most of them turn out false, which seems to be objectively negative for the man, just as S2 requires. How high its risk of occurrence is—that is, how risky it is—depends on how probable its occurrence is. For it gives rise to at least as many questions as it attempts to answer. On the other hand, the expected ratio of a certain basketball player’s free-throw shots being successful might be of 90 percent. Blind chance, or “moral luck,” as philosophers call it, may determine the difference between, say, murder and attempted murder. 2015. He writes, “Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control.” 1 We’ll call this principle, that how good one is cannot depend on factors beyond one’s control, the control principle . Like.....When and where a person was conceived, gestated, and born The genes of the ancestors are a matter of luck, as is the manner in which the parents genetic contribution combined at the time of conception. Moreover, since English speakers use the terms interchangeably, arguing that luck and fortune are two distinct concepts entails that speakers are systematically mistaken in their usage of the terms, which is a hardly tenable error theory. But SP4 might still not yield the right results. However, Coffman (2015: 40) argues that the thesis is not sustainable precisely because it leads to the result that all extremely significant events count as lucky if there is at least a small non-zero chance that they will not happen—for example, the thesis seems to entail that we are lucky to survive every time we take a flight. Well, it depends: it seems that she was unlucky to be involved in two bus bombings, but that she was lucky, once she was involved in them, to have survived them. Let’s start, then, by considering the question of whether we ought to try to equalise welfare or utility (for ‘utility’ read ‘happiness’, or better, ‘wellbeing’). In this sense, that a lucky event could have easily not occurred means that, although it occurs in the actual world, it would fail to occur in close possible worlds. For example, we say things such as “S is lucky to live in an earthquake-free region” even though S ignores it and is therefore lucky that an earthquake will not make her house collapse. I take it that that is rather uncontroversial, though: someone who buys a lottery ticket creates the opportunity for a specific lucky event to take place that someone who does not buy a lottery ticket does not. On the one hand, we exercise effective control over something by competently bringing it to a desired state—for example, by causally influencing it in a certain way. He was an inspirer of both the European Enlightenment and the Constitution of the United States. Pritchard (2005: 132–3) formulates the significance condition as follows: S1: An event E is lucky for an agent S only if S would ascribe significance to E, were S to be availed of the relevant facts. Then, they propose an error theory according to which most people would be mistaken to say that B’s discovery is by luck: B’s discovery is in reality fortunate, not lucky—see section 7 for the specific way in which Pritchard and Levy distinguish luck from fortune. Coffman’s monograph includes extensive criticism of leading theories of luck and argues that luck can be explained in terms of the notion of stroke of luck; it also explores the applications in epistemology and philosophy of action of that idea. Ballantyne argues that investigating the nature of luck does not allow to better understand knowledge. Her paper is enlightening, and uncertainty and luck are notions that are clearly somehow related, but, unfortunately, it is not completely clear from what she writes how uncertainty and the Uncertainty Paradox in particular relate to luck. The case is allegedly troublesome for S2 because the event, which is bad luck for the man, has no impact on the man’s mental states and, in particular, on his interior life, which is not altered. Concerning gradualness, it can be argued that the degree of luck of an event proportionally varies with its significance or value—Latus (2003), Levy (2011: 36), Rescher (1995: 211–12; 2014). Milburn, Joe. 3. For example, a competent pilot who is free or has the capacity to produce and prevent a plane crash but who refuses to take control of the plane for some reason is objectively lucky that a passenger manages to land the plane safely and that as a result survives. On the other hand, how close or immediate should an antecedent be in order to prevent two events from constituting a coincidence is a matter that usually becomes clear in context. Fernando Broncano-Berrocal Coffman proposes an account of strokes of luck. Acknowledgements 1. 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